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I
The arts, literature and poetry have always – that is, at least since Hesiod –
staked their own particular truth claims. As the Muses tell the poet in the
Theogony:
There is much we tell you that only resembles reality,
But, if we wish, we reveal to you also pure truth itself.
With questions which particular form or mode of knowledge that might be,
what kind of truth the rhapsode can claim for himself and how that relates to
the knowledge of a strategian, a charioteer, a physician or even to the knowl-
edge a rhapsode has of his own craft, Socrates in Plato’s Ion will confront his
partners in dialogue, exposing them to the most confusing aporias. The
challenge to bring greater clarity to this puzzling question is taken up by
Aristotle in the ninth chapter of his Poetics, which famously compares and
contrasts the knowledge of a historian with that of a poet: according to him
the historiographer’s knowledge is one of concrete facts appertaining to em-
pirical reality, that of the poet, in contrast, is a knowledge of possibilities and
probabilities and thus philosophóteron kai spoudaioteron, more philosophi-
cal and more serious than the historian’s. Thus, for Aristotle, poetic knowl-
edge occupies an in-between place, a middle ground, between the knowl-
edge of the historian and that of the philosopher: while the former relates to
the specific or particular (ta kath’hékaston) and the latter to the general (ta
kathólu), the poet’s knowledge mediates between, and combines, the partic-
ular and the general and derives from this its unique virtue and power to
move the listener or reader.
Aristoteles’ question and even more so his answers have reverberated
through all periods of Western Geistesgeschichte whenever poetry and the
arts have been challenged to defend and legitimise their own uses and their
own claims to truth. In the English Renaissance, Sir Philip Sidney, for in-
stance, quotes large chunks of Aristotle’s argument almost verbatim in his

Apology for Poetry, and, under the auspices of Modernism,W. K.Wimsatt’s
theory of poetry, according to which poems, as all aesthetic objects, convey
“concrete universals”, which – along the lines of Hegel’s aesthetics – medi-
ate and synthesise the concrete and the universal, is but one of the more re-
cent versions of it.
The question I would like to raise here is smaller in scale – not the gen-
eral question what poetry knows and how poetry knows what it knows, but
the smaller question, which is but a pointed aspect of this larger one and
which has already been aired in Plato’s Ion, namely what poetry and poets
know about themselves, how they know that and, above all, how they com-
municate this knowledge. And I shall not, once again, evoke Aristotle’s au-
thority in this context, but a philosophical text of the middle of the twenti-
eth century which addresses not questions of aesthetics or poetics at all and
has, to my knowledge, never been considered in such a context before. I am
referring to Gilbert Ryle’s  lecture delivered to the British “Aristotelian
Society”, which discusses, under the title Knowing How and Knowing That
the strictly epistemological question of different modes of knowing and dif-
ferent types of knowledge. Ryle’s knowing that is a knowledge that can be
discursively expressed in propositions and that we find in its purest form in
the textbooks of science; it is the knowledge «that something is the case».
Knowing how, in contrast, is the knowledge of «how to do things». Where
knowing that is the domain of texts and maps and diagrams, which store
and order information and make it retrievable, knowing how is the perfor-
mative mode of knowledge, the knowledge of a craftsman or an artist on
how to work with his materials and tools, or the knowledge of an acrobat,
a musician, a dancer or a shaman how to move his body, or the knowledge
of a scientist how to arrange and conduct an experiment and represent the
results to greatest advantage. This is an embodied knowledge, the bodily
trace of prior training through imitation, repetition, trial and error and per-
fecting practice and thus also a form of memory, one that has inscribed it-
self into the body. It resides in a “remembering how”, a kinaesthetic mem-
ory which does not lend itself readily or at all to being translated in texts or
diagrams – just think of how problematic any notation for dances is. One
acquires it therefore not by studying texts or diagrams but by doing, and
one memorises it and makes it one’s own through repeated re-enactment
and practice.
Knowing how is not, Ryle insists, the practical “application” of some pri-
or theoretical knowledge or knowledge of rules but «is realised in perfor-
mances which conform to the rule, not in theoretical citations of it». (In
German one might, perhaps, express the opposition between these two
forms in terms of “kennen” for knowing that vs. “können” for knowing
how.) Or, summed up in Ryle’s genealogical metaphor: «the propositional
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acknowledgement of rules, reasons or principles is not the parent of the in-
telligent application of them; it is a step-child of that application». Know-
ing how is actualised and instantated in what the knowing person does and
how he or she does it and can only be extended, perfected and conveyed to
others in processes involving bodily and sensuous experiences and interac-
tions, not «in the propounding of propositions» or in the «accumulation of
pieces of knowledge-that».
The seduction is great to relate this knowing howmodel of performative
knowledge to the kind of knowledge actualised and conveyed in poetry, or
in aesthetic communication in general, and explore and test its usefulness for
a definition of poetic or aesthetic knowledge. I shall, however, refrain from
this grand gesture and will confine myself to one partial aspect of this over-
whelming question and consider the difference between the poetological
knowledge of a certain period and its poetical praxis, its poesis, in the light
of Ryle’s distinction between knowing that and knowing how. This may,
hopefully, help to go beyond the common reduction of poesis or poetry to an
application of poetics. What I find particularly intriguing when it comes to
the opposition between poetry and poetics is what lies in-between, i.e. what
is poetry and poetics at the same time. What I shall focus on, therefore, is
poetry that thematises its own poetological frames – is metapoetry as an en-
counter of poetry and poetics of the third kind.
II
Let me begin with a simple text-book case. From the late sixteenth century
onwards, English manuals of poetics are aware of the “alexandrine”: they
know that it is a verse of twelve syllables, that it is the standards measure of
poetry in France and thus the functional equivalent to the English five-beat
blank verse or the equally five-beat heroic couplet. A characteristic defini-
tion of the period is that of George Puttenham in his widely circulating Arte
of English Poesie of :
This meeter of twelue sillables the French man calleth a verse Alexandrine, and is
with our moderne rimers most vsuall: with the ancient makers it was not so. For be-
fore Sir Thomas Wiats [Wyatt’s] time they were not vsed in our vulgar, they be for
graue and stately matters fitter than for any other ditty of pleasure.
And the poets of his time followed the rules laid out by Puttenham down to
what he says about the alexandrine’s correlation with elevated subject mat-
ters. Thus, for instance, the Elizabethan sonneteers generally do not follow
the model of Ronsard and the Pléiade but prefer the iambic five-beat verse
for this genre of erotic poetry, which they considered too light and pleasur-
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able for the stately alexandrine. If they used this French form at all, it was –
as in Michael Drayton’s praise of England, his Poly-Olbion (-) – for
themes of national importance. Still, the alexandrine never really got natu-
ralised in England; the reason for this was spelt out one and a half centuries
later in Thomas Gray’s Observations on English Metre:
Alexandrines, or verses of twelve syllables, […] must, if they would strike the ear
agreeably, have their pause in the middle […]. And this uniformity in the cæsura is
just the reason why we no longer use them but just to finish a lyric stanza […].
This use of the alexandrine for creating a sense of closure at the end of a stan-
za, i.e. the use of its extra length in comparison to the preceding pentame-
ters for providing metrical cadence and space to round off the stanza and
look forward to the next, had already been observed by Samuel Johnson in
his Life of John Dryden: «The Alexandrine was, I believe, first used by
Spenser, for the sake of closing his stanza with a fuller sound». Edmund
Spenser was, indeed, the first to employ the alexandrine this way in his alle-
gorical chivalric romance, The Faerie Queene (-), for which he in-
vented a new stanzaic formmade up of eight elaborately rhymed iambic pen-
tameters culminating in an alexandrine. Take the following example, the fa-
mous ekphrastic description of the statue of Venus in her grotto (book IV,
canto x, stanza ),
But it in shape and beautie did excell
All other Idoles, which the heathen adore,
Farre passing that, which by surpassing skill
Phidias did make in Paphos Isle of yore,
With which that wretched Greeke, that life forlore
Did fall in loue: yet this much fairer shined,
But couered with a slender veile afore;
And both her feete and legs together twyned
Were with a snake, whose head & tail were fast combyned.
The alexandrine here has a structural poetic function beyond merely
rounding off the stanza, it frames and show-cases here, as it were, the vi-
sual images evoked in the preceding lines, thus setting it off from its con-
text and highlighting it. To achieve such an effect requires a certain poet-
ological knowledge about the alexandrine and its functions of closure,
which the learned Spenser and inventor of this form no doubt command-
ed. Beyond that, however, this stanza demonstrates a great poetic know
how which cannot be reduced to the knowing that of rules and regulations
laid down in poetological treatises but is realised alone the poetic perfor-
mance. This poetic know how shows, for instance, in how Spenser en-
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hances the closure effect of the Alexandrine with rhyme words that fore-
ground the semantics of “twyned” and “combyned”, of tying things up in
conclusion. And it also shows in Spenser’s stretching of the inordinate
length of the alexandrine even further by employing almost exclusively
monosyllabic words with long vowels, and even more so does it show in
the hieroglyphic and emblematic image of the serpent biting its own tail,
which motivates semantically the metrical and structural function of the
alexandrine and makes it meaningful.
And now for the “encounter of the third kind” between poetry and po-
etics! It occurs at the interface of the poetological knowledge of the time
with its poetical praxis and demonstratively deconstructs the opposition be-
tween poetry and poetics. Continuing to use the alexandrine as my para-
digm, I turn for this to the early th century. In this period a convention
flourished that was first introduced by Abraham Cowley and, more promi-
nently, by John Dryden – the convention of occasionally damming up the
quiet flow of the five-beat “heroic couplets” in their reflective poems or
tragedies by an alexandrine, thus creating extra emphasis or moments of
pause and reflection. It is this – as Thomas Gray considered it – «odd cus-
tom» of alexandrines «interspersed arbitrarily among verses of ten sylla-
bles» that we find addressed in young Alexander Pope’s Essay on Criticism
(). In this poemwhich, like Horace’sArs Poetica, aims at summing up the
poetological knowledge of his time in poetic form Pope deals extensively al-
so with questions of meter and versification. Here is what he has to say about
the alexandrine (verse -):
Then, at the last, and only Couplet fraught
With some unmeaning Thing they call a Thought,
A needless Alexandrine ends the Song,
That like a wounded Snake, drags its slow length along.
Pope goes well beyond what Spenser did in my previous example: though
both link the alexandrine with a snake image, Pope alone explicitly refers
with it to the poetic device of the alexandrine and its closure function. Thus
he foregrounds the implementation of the six-beat alexandrine in the con-
text of five-beat heroic couplets and turns it into a show-cased exhibition of
the device. This is “performative” in the strict sense of linguistic pragmatics
in that the form of the utterance here exemplifies what the utterance speaks
about. In other words: the utterance itself “instantates” its propositional
content; the utterance does what it says.
It is this auto-referential loop that turns the verse into a self-staging of
the poetic knowing how on which it is based. This is further highlighted in
the ex negativo strategy employed here: Pope’s alexandrine, just us before
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the verses on triplets, on metrical regularity and on rhyme, demonstrate ex
negativo what one should do by furnishing examples of how one should not
do it. As the preceding series of “unmeaning” verses, i.e. verses formally
correct but semantically inane, the culminating alexandrine is also “need-
less”, as superfluous and mechanical as they were. And the image of the
snake, which in Spenser’s alexandrine hieroglyphically suggested infini-
tude, now turns into the image of a wounded snake, which, like Pope’s
alexandrine itself, does not get anywhere in spite of all its painful efforts.
The sequence of almost exclusively monosyllabic long-vowel words –
“like”, “wounded”, “snake”, “drag”, “slow” – seems to stretch the “length”
both of the snake and of the verse itself to near unbearable lengths and in
this it “enacts” – as a New Critic would have said – phonologically and
rhythmically the painful efforts made by snake and poet. These are bril-
liantly bad verses and as such they demonstrate once again the bravura of
Pope’s poetic knowing how, his perfect mastery of the “Art of Sinking in
Poetry”, to which he dedicated in  an extended essay, Peri Bathous, Or
the Art of Sinking in Poetry.
III
The know-how, the knowing how, which Pope stages so poetically in the ex
negativo performances of his poetological verse epistle, is totally dedicated
to the knowing that of the neo-classical doctrine of his times and confirms
what the Augustans knew about poetry – namely that you do not only need
a feeling heart and the knowledge of fixed rules to write poetry but also sharp
reason and a witty brain. And even the wit with which Pope presents this
knowledge upside-down to make it the more pregnant and convincing, sub-
scribes to this doctrine and imitates its canonical models, among them most
prominently Horace and his Ars Poetica.
What I am driving at here, however, is how a poem in the performance
of its knowing how can stretch the poetological knowing that on which it is
based to its limits or, even beyond that; how the poetic performance can lay
bare the contradictions and aporias of the underlying poetics and “decon-
struct” them, creating space for what is new. In this respect, my alexandrine
examples have only been the first step of my argument, serving as a con-
trastive foil for what is to come. For this, I withdraw now from the th cen-
tury, in which I fell less at home, and choose for my next example of poet-
ic knowing how exhibited inmetapoetical poetry an English Renaissance po-
em, more specifically, a sonnet by Sir Philip Sidney.
The sonnet, a form fashioned and cultivated in Italy, had reached Eng-
land in the early th century already. Accordingly, by Sidney’s time, explicit
knowledge about this type of poem had already been filtered down to fairly
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stable definitions in the manuals of poetics and rhetoric (the two still large-
ly undifferentiated then). Let me quote as a typical example George Gas-
coigne’s Certayne Notes of Instruction Concerning the Making of Verse or
Ryme in English ():
Then haue you Sonnets: some thinke that all Poemes (being short) may be called
Sonnets, as in deede it is a diminutive worde derived of Sonare, but yet I can beste
allowe to call those Sonnets whiche are of fouretene lynes, every line conteyning
tenne syllables. The firste twelve do ryme in staues of foure lines by crosse meetre,
and the last two ryming togither do conclude the whole.
Or, to say that with royal authority, the authority of the Scottish King James
VI, Elizabeth’s successor as the English King James I, who laid down in his
Schort Treatise Conteining Some Revlis and Cautelis to be Observit and Es-
chewit in Scottis Poesie of  that sonnets consist «of fourtene lynis, and ten
fete in every lyne» and applied that knowledge in two dedicatory sonnets to
the reader and to the perfect poet.
The manuals of poetics and rhetorics know that a sonnet consists of
fourteen lines arranged in rhymed groups of verses, they know that it derives
from Italy and that it speaks of love and that the elaboration of this topic –
lament over unrequited love or praise of the beloved’s virtues and beauties
– requires all the help that rhetorical art can offer. Thus King James insists
in his dedicatory “Sonnet decifring the perfyte poete” that the writer of a
sonnet has first of all
With memorie to keip quhat he dois reid,
With skilfulnes and figuris, quhilks proceid
From Rhetorique,
to become a perfect poet. He needs to know all the strategies of ethos,
pathos and logos – of self-expression, appeal and argumentation – which
rhetoric puts at his disposal. In George Puttenham’s Arte of English Poesie
(), a poetological treatise particularly close to the handbooks of rhetoric,
this becomes one of the defining elements or norms of the sonnet, which for
Puttenham is dedicated primarily to the expression of oscillating and mixed
feelings:
it requireth a forme of Poesie variable, inconstant, affected, curious and most witty
of any others, wherof the ioyes were to be vttered in one sorte, the sorrowes in an
other, and by the many formes of Poesie, the many moodes and pangs of louers,
throughly to be discouered […] with a thousand delicate deuises, odes, songs, ele-
gies, ballads, sonets and other ditties, moouing one way and another to great com-
passion.
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The manuals of poetics and rhetoric also agreed that the sonnet as a “lyric
poem” occupied an elevated rank in the hierarchy of eight genres; both in
Puttenham’sArte of English Poesie, Francis Meres’s Palladis Thamia ()
and in Philip Sidney’s Apology for Poetry (posth. ) it took the second
highest rank just beneath the “heroic poem”. For poems of such a cul-
tural prestige, the manuals further agreed, mimesis naturae, i.e. the imita-
tion of reality, in this case the beauty of the beloved and the truth of the
lover’s emotions, did not suffice; it needed to be enhanced, embellished
and heightened by mimesis veterum, i.e. the imitation of the classical mas-
ters, the canonical models of the genre, in this case, particularly Petrarch,
whose best inventions and topoi they should imitate and even emulate or
try to surpass in order to display their own wit at its most impressive and
compelling.
The distinction between mimesis naturae and mimesis veterum had al-
ready been spelt out in England in the mid-th century in Roger Ascham’s
Scholemaster. In his chapter on imitation, he characteristically mentions on-
ly briefly the imitation «of the life of euerie degree of man» aiming at giving
«a faire liuelie painted picture» of it, and concentrates rather on a second
and a third type of imitation which consist in following «for learning of
tonges and sciences the best authors»:
The third kinde of Imitation belongeth to the second: as, when you be determined
whether ye will folow one or mo, to know perfitlie, and which way to folow, that one;
in what place; by what meane and order; by what tooles and instrumentes ye shall
do it; by what skill and iudgement ye shall trewelie discerne whether ye folow rightlie
or no.
In the praxis of English sonneteering, which began in the early th century,
this shows in the intensive dialogue of the “Courtly Makers” with Petrarch,
whose sonnets were being variously translated and adapted to Tudor con-
texts. And it shows even more clearly when, in the second half of the cen-
tury, the manuals of poetics and rhetoric, for instance Abraham Fraunce’s
Arcadian Rhetorike () increasingly draw upon English Petrarchan son-
nets to exemplify and illustrate their rich and systematically classified arse-
nals of tropes and figures.
Imitatio veterum is a poetological program that appeals in particular to
the experts of knowing that, the humanist scholars and schoolmasters. The
sonneteers, however, or at least some of the best of them, soon began to turn
against it with the better knowledge of the experienced practitioner. One of
the first of them here – first both in time and in rank – was Sir Philip Sidney,
who, a few years before his death in  had written more or less at the same
time not only one of the best English sonnet cycles, Astrophil and Stella, but
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also themost incisive poetological text of the English Renaissance, hisApolo-
gie for Poetrie. In the critical light of Sidney’s neo-Platonic re-foundation of
poetological theory, which he develops in the first part of his Apologie, little
of the contemporary English production, to which he turns in the second
part, can pass muster. And his critique becomes particularly sharp when he
addresses himself to the English sonneteers of his own times: their sonnets
are so insignificant and ineffectual precisely because they follow religiously
the poetico-rhetorical program of recycling again and again the devices of
the canonical masters:
Other sorts of Poetry [besides drama] almost haue we none, but that Lyricall kind
of Songs and Sonnets: which, Lord, if he gaue us so good mindes, how well it might
be imployed […]. But truely many of such writings as come vnder the banner of vn-
resistable loue, if I were a Mistres, would neuer perswade mee they were in loue; so
coldely they apply fiery speeches, as men that had rather red Louers writings, and so
caught vp certaine swelling phrases, which hang together like a man which once
tolde mee the winde was at North West, and by South, because he would be sure to
name windes enowe [enough], – then that in truth they feele those passions, which
easily (as I think) may be bewrayed [revealed] by that same forciblenes, or Energia
(as the Greekes cal it), of the writer. But let this bee a sufficient though short note,
that wee misse the right vse of the materiall point of Poesie.
What makes Sidney’s text, the quality of his prose, so striking is that it is writ-
ten with the kind of energia that is conspicuously absent in the discursive
prose of the contemporary English manuals and treatises of rhetoric and po-
etics. The emphatic gestuality of the language, the repeated self-references –
«if I were a Mistres», «as I think» – and the personal anecdote give to his
polemics against the imitatores veterum and the counter-productive artistry
and artificiality of their discourses of love precisely that persuasive force
based on personal experience in which the sonneteers attacked here lack so
sadly. Though rejecting a particular rhetorical poetics, he does not, howev-
er, argue in a poetological nirvana but evokes in his brief reference to the
performative force of energeia («as the Greekes cal it») an alternative aes-
thetics of expression and effect which goes back to Aristotle andQuintilian
and which, quite recently, Julius Caesar Scaliger in his Poetices Libri Septem
() had put on the agenda again in almost the same words: «Efficaciam
Graeci ένέργειαν vocant».
What Sidney here opposes so energetically against the consensual
knowledge of the poetological rhetoric or rhetorical poetics of his own cul-
ture, he explores and puts to the test in his sonnet cycle Astrophil and Stel-
la, working out his own knowing how and exhibiting it at the same time. In
a series of metapoetical sonnet, which punctuate his cycle, he thematises the
poetological turn he advocates – the turn against the hackneyed Petrarchan
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paradoxes of «freesing fires» (sonnet ), against the «Dictionarie’s methode»
of those who do nothing but rehearse once again «Petrarch’s long deceased
woes» (sonnet ), against continuing to weave their poetic tapestry on «al-
legorie’s curious frame» (sonnet ) or against the withering wreaths of
rhetoric’s «choisest flowers», with which he will no longer adorn his own
sonnets (sonnet ). This begins already with the first sonnet, which, as of-
ten in sonnet cycles, is programmatically metapoetic:
Loving in truth, and faine in verse my love to show,
That the deare She might take some pleasure of my paine:
Pleasure might cause her reade, reading might make her know,
Knowledge might pitie winne, and pitie grace obtaine,
I sought fit words to paint the blackest face of woe,
Studying inventions fine, her wits to entertaine:
Oft turning others’ leaves, to see if thence would flow
Some fresh and fruitfull showers upon my sunne-burn’d braine.
But words came halting forth, wanting Invention’s stay,
Invention, Nature’s child, fled step-dame Studie’s blowes,
And others’ feete still seem’d but strangers in my way.
Thus great with child to speake, and helplesse in my throwes [throes],
Biting my trewand [truant] pen, beating my selfe for spite,
«Fool», said my Muse to me, «looke in thy heart and write».
Sidney’s sonnet follows faithfully the “English” sonnet form as set down by
George Gascoigne: three quartets with alternate rhymes and a concluding
couplet – the form that Shakespeare was soon to canonise in his Sonnets (first
published in , though some of them may have circulated in manuscript
long before that date). He follows it, yet at the same time he varies and goes
beyond it in at least three respects:
. Instead of the iambic pentameter one would expect, this opening son-
net – as a few later ones (, , , , ) – employs a six-beat verse, which
responds to the alexandrines of the Pléiade sonneteers, yet wavers between
iambic, trochaic and dactylic metre and varies the caesura from line to line.
Thus defeating the reader’s expectation, it draws attention to itself and in
particular to its meter and rhythm, and, with its extra syllables, these qua-
si-alexandrines allow for greater space and scope of argument.
. The rhyme-scheme over-fulfils the norm of phonological equivalence in
that all the rhymes of the three quartets revolve around two rhyming diph-
thongs only – [ei] and [ou]. This binds the quartets more closely together
than usual and, at the same time, sets off the couplet with its new rhyming
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diphthong [ai] more emphatically from the preceding three quartets than is
the case even in Shakespeare’s often surprising couplets.
. The syntactical segmentation runs counter to the structural division of
the English sonnet: a single sentence straddles the first two quartets, against
which is set off the third quartet, which starts a new and adversative sentence
(«But words came halting forth»). This extends to and embraces the cou-
plet, the concluding point of which is already introduced in the last verse of
the third quartet («Thus great with child»). What shines through here as in
a palimpsest, is the “Italian” or Petrarchan sonnet with its division into oc-
tave and sestet with its volta in the direction of the argument, a volta often
clearly marked with the adversative ma or, just as here with Sidney’s but.
Why do I enter into such formal or even formalistic details at such great
lengths? – Because, as I shall try to demonstrate, these are not merely for-
malistic. They are the pre-condition and a crucial part of Sidney’s poetic art
and a demonstration of his artistic knowing howwith which he challenges in
actu the knowing that of the predominant rhetorical poetics of the sonnet.
Mind you, the sonnet actually begins in the most elevated style of rhetoric
with the particularly artificial figure of the pseudo-consecutive climax or gra-
datio which, following the textbook rules for effectual persuasion to the let-
ter, leads from “pleasure” via “reading” to “knowledge” and then from
“knowledge” via “pitie” to “grace”, the graceful acceptance of the wooing
lover by the lady. This is so highly rhetorical and so much in accordance with
the teaching of the rhetorical treatises, that one of them, Abraham Fraunce’s
Arcadian Rhetorike (I, ) will actually quote the first five verses of this son-
net as a model of this figure of speech and hold it up for imitation. What
Fraunce overlooked in his collecting frenzy is, however, that Sidney here has
his speaker narrate a story the point of which defies and denies the knowl-
edge of the rhetorical handbooks and thus also that of his own Arcadian
Rhetorike! The story about himself as loving wooer, the story how he had
tried to win his lady’s grace, begins on an optimistic note, his initial trust in
the persuasive powers of imitatio veterum as set down in the manuals: the
study of “inventions fine” in the poetic “leaves” () and “feet” () of the
canonical authors. He then goes on to tell us, how this confidence broke
down to give way to a sense of paralysis and aporia described, at the begin-
ning of the third quartet, as a kind of writer’s block, and how it turns at the
end into the painful despair of never-ending birth “throwes” () and self-
flagellation. Deliverance from this comes only at the very end, in the last line,
actually the last half-line, in the words theMuse spoke to him: «Looke in thy
heart and write».
This story stages a poetological opposition revolving round one crucial
term, which is highlighted as such by being used three times: “invention” (,
. ). It appears in two different forms: once in the plural and non-capi-
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talised and twice capitalised and in the singular. While the pluralised “in-
ventions” of the second quartet are sought for in the writings of the others
and thus are closely related to the study and imitation of canonical models,
the personified “Invention” of the following quartet is related directly to the
imitation of nature, as the genealogical allegory of child, mother and step-
mother makes clear. The opposition is so transparently structured that it can
readily be represented in a diagram:
Inventions vs. Invention
study Nature
others’ leaves thy heart
others’ feete
> imitatio veterum imitatio naturae
study loving in truth
wits, brain, fine heart
> rationally calculated spontaneous
sunne-burn’d braine fresh and fruitfull showers
leaves [of a book] leaves [of a plant]
feete [metrical] feete [anatomical]
biting, beating great with child, throwes
> sterility vitality, fertility
show, cause, make, win looke, write
obtain, entertain… truth
> rhetorical persuasion poetic self-expression
The story the speaker tells about himself does, however, not only speak ex-
plicitly in its transparently antithetical terms about the rhetorical-poetic sys-
tem which it rejects; the way it is told, and the way it plays with and against
the formal structure of the sonnet, enacts or performs what it is about. The
increasing tensions between the metrical division of the sonnet and the syn-
tactical division in sentences and clauses, together with the increase in
rhyme-words formed by static nouns and the parallel increase in seemingly
endless purely iambic verses (, , , , , , ) right down to the threshold
of the concluding couplet, enact rhythmically the movement of the story –
the movement from its hopeful opening gestures, which then get bogged
down more and more until, at the very end, the intervention of the Muse,
her «Looke in thy heart and write», launches a new and liberating impulse.
The liberating impulse is delayed to the very last moment and this makes it
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the more surprising and emphatic: syntactically it is initiated in the third but
last verse, rhyme-wise in the penultimate verse, and in terms of argument in
the last verse, to be stated pointedly only in the last half-verse. What further
enhances the effect of «Looke in thy heart and write» is its style: it totally dis-
rupts what has been the sonnet’s stylistic norm so far. What could, after the
syntactic complexities and the rhetorical elaborations of the preceding lines,
be simpler than this appeal in throughout monosyllabic, non-figurative and
kersey “Germanic” words? What we seem to witness here is the break-
through of the speaker to a new, direct, immediate language of the heart – if
not the breakthrough, in the heart of Renaissance poetry, to a Romantic aes-
thetics of unmediated self-expression, the often celebrated moment of
“birth of the modern subject”.
Things are, however, hardly ever of such mythical simplicity. If we look
closer at the poem, we realise that the performance of the speaker with
which Sidney stages his own knowing how is not all that simple. What tells
against the simple and widely accepted reading is most obviously that the
following  sonnets of the cycle do by no means renounce the highly or-
nate style and the argumentative strategies recommended by rhetorical po-
etics; they actually take them to extremes again and again. And what equal-
ly tells against it is that this particular and programmatic first sonnet helps
itself quite avidly to the verbal delicacies of the rhetorical banquet – the gra-
datio and repetitio, the figura etymologica and the polyptoton, the hyperbole,
metaphora, metonomia, paronomasia and allegoria. And even its final point
remains deeply, even parasitically, indebted to rhetorical knowledge: to re-
nounce rhetoric is in itself a time-honoured rhetorical device. Just think of
Mark Antony’s «I am no orator» in his great funeral speech in Julius Caesar
(III, ii, ), demonstrating his superb rhetorical skills in the very act of
denying them! Renouncing rhetorical art is in itself a rhetorical strategy,
part of rhetoric’s arsenal of persuasive devices, a specific form of dissimula-
tion with which, by way of celare or negare artem, the speaker fashions for
himself the captivating masque of artless sincerity. And, more specifically,
the appeal to find in one’s own heart, and not in canonical models, the most
fertile source of inspiration is in itself a poetic topos of canonical love po-
etry, according to which the lover who follows the appeal to “look in his
heart” will find in his very heart the image of his beloved, the true object of
his sincere imitatio naturae.
Wherein, then, resides Sidney’s own and particular know-how? It resides
in his art of exhibiting in “energetic” and sharply pointed performances that
there is no way of not speaking rhetorically, neither for the politician nor for
the lover. This is a kind of knowledge beyond the rhetorical and poetologi-
cal manuals of his time and was to be put into the discursive terms of know-
ing that only by linguists and language philosophers in our own times. Sid-
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ney’s knowing how, embodied and enacted in the performance of his sonnet,
thus does not only translate contemporary rhetorical knowing that into po-
etic language, but transcends it by showing up and showcasing its limitations.
It was precisely in this achievement that Sidney’s sonnets became the new
model for other Elizabethan sonneteers, among them, most prominently,
Shakespeare.
Such knowing how can never be fully translated into discursive explicit-
ness and any poetological discourse therefore must always fall short of this
kind of knowledge, which only emerges in, and from, embodied and drama-
tised performances and can alone be communicated in the enactment and
re-enactment of such a drama and theatre of language. For this, I can evoke
the authority of the first Sidney critic, himself a great performance artist in
prose, the authority of Thomas Nashe, who wrote in his preface to the first
quarto edition of Astrophil and Stella ():
let not your surfeted sight […] think scorne to turn aside into this Theater of plea-
sure, for here you shal find a paper stage streud with pearle, an artificial heau’n to
ouershadow the fair frame, & christal wals to encounter your curious eyes, while the
tragicommody of loue is performed by starlight.
It is in the performative knowing how, as I have tried to show, that the po-
tential of poetic and aesthetic communication for innovation as well as for
resistance and subversion resides. To expect from a poem any extension or
progress of knowing that can only lead to disappointment; for that one bet-
ter turns to the propositional discourses of science and philosophy. The “sin-
gular” achievement of the literary and the aesthetic realises itself in perfor-
mances rather, each one of them an event and a process – in performances
that do not simply thematise the propositions of knowing that but, as it were,
thematise the thematising of such propositions and thus put them – and it –
in question. To say it with Derek Attridge in his remarkable essay onThe Sin-
gularity of Literature: «literature does not present themes as such, but rather
takes the reader through a process of thematising». And that also means that
in performing [and that would include reading as well] the work, I am taken through
its performance of language’s potency; indeed, I, or the “I” that is engaged with the
work, could be said to be performed by it. This performed I is an I in process, un-
dergoing the changes wrought by, and in, the encounter with alterity.
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